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BOYLE  AS  CONSTITUTIONAL  PREEMPTION
Bradford R. Clark*
INTRODUCTION
During his remarkable tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin
Scalia was widely acknowledged to be the Court’s leading proponent of textu-
alism and originalism1—methodological commitments that instruct judges to
interpret legal texts according to what a reasonably skilled user of language
would have understood the text to mean at the time of its adoption.  These
commitments generally led Justice Scalia to disfavor doctrines—such as fed-
eral common law—that license judges to exercise broad discretion
unmoored from federal constitutional or statutory texts.2  Such doctrines are
in tension with separation of powers and federalism because they enable
judges to encroach upon the constitutional domain of the political branches
and the states.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technol-
ogies Corp.3 arguably departed from his usual preferences by recognizing a
government contractor defense as a matter of federal common law.4
Numerous critics have pointed out the apparent inconsistency between
Boyle and Justice Scalia’s broader methodological commitments.  Whatever
one thinks of the Court’s opinion, however, the actual decision in Boyle finds
substantial support in the text and structure of the Constitution.  When the
executive branch contracts to procure specialized military equipment to
meet its needs, it does so pursuant to constitutional and statutory authoriza-
tion.  It is these underlying constitutional and statutory provisions—not fed-
© 2017 Bradford R. Clark.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William Cranch Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School.  I dedicate this Essay to Justice Antonin Scalia for whom I clerked during the
October 1989 Term.  I thank A.J. Bellia, Bill Kelley, John Manning, and Amanda Tyler for
their insightful comments and suggestions, and Zachary Tyree for excellent research
assistance.
1 See William K. Kelley, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1601 (2012).
2 See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV.
747 (2017) (book review).
3 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
4 For an earlier analysis of Boyle, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Struc-
tural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1368–75 (1996).
2129
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 2 15-JUN-17 10:57
2130 notre dame law review [vol. 92:5
eral common law rules—that preempt a state’s efforts to deter or impede the
performance of such contracts.  Understanding Boyle as a case of constitu-
tional preemption avoids reliance on disfavored doctrines of judicial discre-
tion such as federal common law.
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I summarizes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boyle and describes both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions.  Part II recounts various criticisms of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Boyle,
particularly the claim that he abandoned his deeper commitments to textual-
ism, originalism, separation of powers, and federalism.  Part III offers an
alternative rationale for the decision in Boyle grounded in constitutional pre-
emption, and explains why this approach is more consistent with Justice
Scalia’s broader methodological and constitutional commitments.
I. THE BOYLE DECISION
Boyle was a state law wrongful death action brought by the estate of a U.S.
Marine helicopter copilot who died when his helicopter crashed in the waters
off the coast of Virginia during a training exercise.5  The copilot drowned
after the crash because—in accordance with the military’s design specifica-
tions—the helicopter’s hatch opened “out” rather than “in.”6  The estate
could not sue the United States or the government officials who approved
the specifications because they were immune from suit.  Accordingly, the
copilot’s father brought a diversity action in federal court against the helicop-
ter’s manufacturer, United Technologies, alleging that the company had
defectively designed the copilot’s emergency escape system.7
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded dam-
ages against the manufacturer.8  The Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal,
holding that the defendant satisfied the requirements of the “military con-
tractor defense” recognized by that court in another case.9  The Supreme
Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari and upheld the
validity of this defense as a matter of federal common law.
Justice Scalia began his analysis in Boyle by rejecting the contention
“that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government con-
tractors from liability for design defects, there is no basis for judicial recogni-
tion of such a defense.”10  He explained that the Supreme Court has
held that a few areas, involving “uniquely federal interests,” are so commit-
ted by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that
state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a
5 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
6 Id. at 502–03.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 503.
9 Id. (quoting Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986)).
10 Id. at 504.
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content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-
called “federal common law.”11
He found federal common law applicable in Boyle because “the civil lia-
bilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement contracts”
implicate a uniquely federal interest.12  The Court found this interest to be
closely related to two uniquely federal interests previously recognized by the
Court: the rights and obligations of the United States under its contracts, and
the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken within the course of their
duty.13  Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that Boyle involved “an inde-
pendent contractor performing its obligation under a procurement contract,
rather than an official performing his duty as a federal employee,” he
stressed that both scenarios “obviously implicated the same interest in getting
the Government’s work done.”14
Having found a uniquely federal interest, Justice Scalia proceeded to
examine whether there was a significant conflict between this interest and
the operation of state law.  He found the requisite conflict because “[i]t
makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for
the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary
when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it con-
tracts for the production.”15  In either case, the application of state tort law
would burden or impede the federal government’s objective.  For these rea-
sons, the Supreme Court “agree[d] with the scope of displacement adopted
by the Fourth Circuit.”16
In a forceful dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Supreme “Court
lacks both authority and expertise to fashion such a rule” of federal common
law.17  He asserted that the Court had never extended immunity beyond fed-
eral officers to nongovernment employees such as government contractors.18
He also pointed out that Congress had considered but failed to enact a law
establishing a federal contractor defense.19  Thus, he concluded that the
Court’s recognition of a government contractor defense was improper
because “[w]e are judges not legislators, and the vote is not ours to cast.”20
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens did not reject federal common lawmak-
ing in all cases, but stressed that Congress rather than the Court was “better
equipped to perform the task at hand”21—namely, to balance “the conflict-
11 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640 (1981)).
12 Id. at 506.
13 Id. at 504–05.
14 Id. at 505.
15 Id. at 512.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18 See id. at 522–23.
19 Id. at 531.
20 Id.
21 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program
and the protection of the rights of the individual.”22
Boyle’s majority and dissenting opinions appear to represent something
of a role reversal for their authors.  In other cases, Justice Scalia generally
disfavored broad judicial lawmaking whereas Justice Brennan frequently
championed such lawmaking.  It would be easy to dismiss Boyle’s role reversal
as an aberration based on policy preferences.  As Part III of this Essay
explains, however, the decision actually rests on a firmer constitutional foun-
dation than mere federal common law.  Nonetheless, as the next Part
recounts, commentators have been quick to point out the apparent inconsis-
tency between Justice Scalia’s opinion in Boyle and his larger methodological
commitments.
II. CRITICISM OF BOYLE
Numerous commentators have observed that Boyle represented a depar-
ture from Justice Scalia’s general commitments to textualism and original-
ism, and marked “a notable exception to Justice Scalia’s objections to federal
common-lawmaking.”23  For example, soon after the decision, Professor Nick
Zeppos wrote that “the result in Boyle seems flatly inconsistent with the textu-
alist approach.”24  Even if the Supreme Court believed that “the military
could not function if its contractors were subject to state tort law,” Zeppos
explained, “the usual textualist response to such ‘policy’ arguments is to rele-
gate litigants to the legislative process.”25
Likewise, Professor Bill Marshall described Boyle as an example of “non-
originalist activism.”26  In his view, “[n]o text or history supports a military
contractor’s defense, and no argument from constitutional structure can jus-
tify the Court’s creation of federal tort law in this case (federal courts are,
after all, not common law courts).”27  Indeed, Marshall characterized Boyle as
a “breathtaking” example of judicial activism because it “transgressed federal-
ism concerns” and “ignored separation of powers.”28
Somewhat more charitably, Professor Caleb Nelson has suggested that
Boyle was a consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach to federal com-
22 Id. at 532.
23 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1909 n.19 (2011).
24 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1367 (1990).
25 Id. at 1368.
26 William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1217, 1231 (2002).
27 Id.
28 Id. (footnote omitted); see also Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New
Erie” Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 788–90 (“Justice Scalia engaged in significant judicial
legislation in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.”); Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1383 (1996) (“Boyle is an activist decision because the Court
usurped Congress’ role in creating the new defense.”).
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mon law, which seeks to limit such law to several “narrow areas”29 or
“enclaves.”30  On the one hand, this approach leads judges to “conclude that
they cannot legitimately recognize federal common law on many topics.”31
On the other hand, “[i]n areas where courts do recognize federal common
law, federal judges can properly base the content of that law on their own
views of sound policy” because they “are operating on the theory that they
enjoy delegated power to make law (as opposed to the duty to identify rules
of decision supplied by pre-existing sources).”32  Nelson suggests that per-
haps “Justice Scalia can be forgiven for not trying to derive the applicable
rule of decision from . . . external sources”33 given that the Court’s current
approach “encourage[s] relatively unconstrained judicial policymaking” in
recognized enclaves.34
Other commentators, including Professor Tom Merrill, regard Boyle’s
embrace of federal common law as little more than an aberration.35  Accord-
ing to Merrill, “[b]oth before and after the decision, recourse to federal com-
mon law was noticeably diminishing.”36  More specifically, he pointed out
that
Justice Scalia’s freewheeling, policy-based analysis in Boyle contrasts
sharply with his subsequent decision for the Court in O’Melveny & Myers,
where he declined to apply federal common law to determine the duty of a
law firm to investigate fraud committed by a savings and loan client subse-
quently taken over by the FDIC.  The latter decision stresses the illegitimacy
of lawmaking by courts, and observes that the “function of weighing and
appraising” multiple variables is best left for the legislature.37
In sum, commentators have criticized Justice Scalia’s decision in Boyle
largely on the grounds that it was inconsistent with his overarching commit-
ments to textualism, originalism, separation of powers, and federalism—com-
mitments to which he adhered more faithfully both before and after Boyle.
Upon deeper analysis, however, Boyle may not be as great a departure from
29 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
30 See Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1,
42–45 (2015).
31 Id. at 42.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 44.
34 Id. at 45.
35 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 463 (2010).
36 Id.
37 Id. n.64 (citations omitted) (quoting O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89
(1994)).  Professor Merrill similarly criticized Justice Scalia’s practice of joining the Rehn-
quist Court’s federalism decisions on the ground that these votes were inconsistent with his
sincerely held beliefs. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).  Upon analysis, however, Justice
Scalia’s votes in federalism cases were largely—if not entirely—consistent with his respect
for the constitutional structure. See Bradford R. Clark, The Constitutional Structure and the
Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 753 (2003).
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these commitments as these critics believe.  In fact, there is a plausible case
that Boyle was a relatively straightforward case of constitutional preemption
based on a direct conflict between state tort law and federal actions author-
ized by both federal constitutional and statutory provisions.  Part III exam-
ines this potential alternative rationale for Boyle and several historical
antecedents.
III. RERATIONALIZING BOYLE AS CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION
Notwithstanding the criticisms described in Part II, the decision in Boyle
may have a firmer constitutional foundation than the one set forth in Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that
the Constitution preempts state law that operates to burden or impede the
legitimate exercise of federal authority.  Such “constitutional preemption” is
not an example of federal common law.  Rather, it is a relatively straightfor-
ward application of the Supremacy Clause to resolve conflicts between state
law and the Constitution dating back to the early days of the republic.38  Fed-
eral common law, by contrast, is a twentieth-century innovation that permits
courts to fashion “federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced
directly by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or consti-
tutional commands.”39
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland40 provides an
important early example of constitutional preemption.  Although the deci-
sion is best known for upholding Congress’s power to charter the Second
Bank of the United States, it also held that the Constitution preempted Mary-
land’s efforts to tax the Bank.  On the first question, the Court acknowledged
that the Constitution did not give Congress express power to incorporate a
bank.41  The Court nonetheless upheld this power as a proper means of exe-
cuting “the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regu-
late commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support
armies and navies.”42  After observing that “the powers given to the govern-
ment imply the ordinary means of execution,”43 the Court proceeded to
reject Maryland’s contention that the Necessary and Proper Clause somehow
38 See generally Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-
emption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).  Although the original understanding of the
Supremacy Clause alone might support this kind of constitutional preemption, the early
decisions of the Marshall Court provide additional support for preemption in these cir-
cumstances.  Thus, one need not rely exclusively on Founding materials to find constitu-
tional preemption in Boyle, but can also invoke “arguments predicated upon text,
structure, and purpose, as well as unfolding historical practice and precedent.”  Amanda L.
Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1739, 1750 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
39 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 635 (7th ed. 2015).
40 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
41 Id. at 406.
42 Id. at 407.
43 Id. at 409.
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limited Congress’s choice of means.  The Court gave two reasons why “[the
clause] cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress”44—first,
“[t]he clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limita-
tions on those powers,”45 and second, “[i]ts terms purport to enlarge, not to
diminish the powers vested in the government.”46  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that Congress has broad constitutional power to employ all means
“plainly adapted” to the pursuit of “legitimate” ends.47
Having concluded that the Constitution gave Congress authority to
incorporate a bank with a branch in Maryland, the McCulloch Court pro-
ceeded to answer the second question presented in the case: “Whether the
State of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch?”48
The Court concluded that the Constitution preempted Maryland’s efforts to
tax the Bank based on three propositions:
1st. [T]hat a power to create implies a power to preserve.  2nd. That a power
to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with
these powers to create and to preserve.  3d. That where this repugnancy
exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over
which it is supreme.49
The McCulloch Court applied these principles broadly to conclude that any
attempt by Maryland to tax the Bank was unconstitutional and void.
Maryland conceded that “the States may [not] directly resist a law of
Congress,”50 but argued that the Constitution leaves the states the right to
exercise their acknowledged powers (including the power of taxation) upon
acts of Congress “in the confidence that they will not abuse it.”51  The
Supreme Court rejected this proposition in the broadest possible terms,
declaring that “the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitu-
tional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the general government.”52  The Court characterized this conclusion as “the
unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has
declared.”53
44 Id. at 420.
45 Id. at 419.
46 Id. at 420.  Professor Samuel Bray has recently offered an additional reason in sup-
port of the Court’s interpretation.  He argues that “necessary and proper” is an example of
a figure of speech known as “hendiadys, in which two terms separated by a conjunction
work together as a single complex expression.”  Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and
“Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016).
47 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.  For a discussion of McCulloch’s continuing
relevance to a wide range of questions, see John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Consti-
tutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2014).
48 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425.
49 Id. at 426.
50 Id. at 427.
51 Id. at 428.
52 Id. at 436.
53 Id.
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The McCulloch Court’s reliance on constitutional preemption has obvi-
ous relevance to cases such as Boyle.  To be sure, the plaintiff in Boyle did not
go so far as to argue that Virginia could prohibit a manufacturer from supply-
ing the federal government with military equipment built according to the
government’s precise specifications.  But he did argue that Virginia could
hold the manufacturer liable in tort for design defects associated with such
equipment.  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such liability could, in
the words of the McCulloch Court, “retard, impede, burden, or in [some]
manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Con-
gress” to procure military equipment.54  For this reason, the Supreme Court
could have relied on McCulloch’s second holding to conclude that the Consti-
tution itself preempted the application of Virginia tort law in Boyle.
Critics of the military contractor defense might try to distinguish McCul-
loch from Boyle on the ground that the application of state tax law to the
Second Bank of the United States represented a more direct interference
with federal functions than the application of state tort law to a private mili-
tary contractor.  Although it is sometimes assumed that the Bank was a gov-
ernment entity, its charter established that private interests would control the
Bank.  To be sure, Congress chartered the Bank for public purposes, but the
charter specified that eighty percent of the Bank’s capital stock would be
held by private investors,55 and only five of its twenty-five directors would be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.56  Thus, McCulloch
did not hold that Maryland’s tax was unconstitutional because it applied to
an instrumentality of the federal government, but because it interfered with
activities authorized by Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers.
The same kind of interference would have resulted from the application
of Virginia tort law to United Technologies’s design of military helicopters in
Boyle.  In the exercise of its powers to raise and support the armed forces,
Congress enacted laws authorizing the military to contract with suppliers to
design and purchase the kinds of equipment needed to fulfill its mission.
The military decided that its mission necessitated helicopters with hatches
that opened out rather than in.  Virginia’s imposition of tort liability on the
manufacturer for providing equipment with these specifications certainly
would have burdened or impeded the operation of these laws.  As Justice
Scalia explained in Boyle, “[t]he imposition of liability on Government con-
tractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the con-
tractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government,
or it will raise its price.”57
Even Justice Brennan’s dissent acknowledged that “the Government
might have to pay higher prices for what it orders if delivery in accordance
with the contract exposes the seller to potential liability.”58  Much like a tax,
54 Id.
55 See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 1, 3 Stat. 266, 266 (expired 1836).
56 Id. § 88, 3 Stat. at 269.
57 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
58 Id. at 521–22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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this added cost would certainly “burden” or “impede” the execution of a valid
federal law enacted pursuant to the Constitution.  If the Constitution prohib-
its Virginia from imposing even a nominal tax on the military’s purchase of
special-order military equipment (as McCulloch established), then it is hard to
see why the Constitution would permit Virginia to impose potentially enor-
mous tort liability on a manufacturer who merely builds and supplies military
equipment according to the government’s specifications.
Another Marshall Court opinion from the same era provides further sup-
port for constitutional preemption in Boyle.  In Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,59 the Supreme Court considered Ohio’s attempt to tax the Bank of the
United States.  After Ohio enacted a substantial tax, the Bank sued the collec-
tor to recover funds forcibly seized from the Bank and to enjoin further
efforts to collect the tax.60  Although the decision is best known for its read-
ing of Article III’s “arising under” jurisdiction,61 it also addressed the consti-
tutionality of Ohio’s efforts to tax the Bank.  After holding that the Bank’s
charter supported federal question jurisdiction, the Court entertained
Ohio’s request that it reconsider its earlier ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Among other things, Ohio “contended, that, admitting Congress to pos-
sess the power [to exempt the Bank from taxation], this exemption ought to
have been expressly asserted in the act of incorporation; and, not being
expressed, ought not to be implied by the Court.”62  The Osborn Court
rejected this contention in terms directly applicable to Boyle.  The Court
began by observing that “[i]t is not unusual, for a legislative act to involve
consequences which are not expressed.”63  The Osborn Court offered the
immunity of federal officers as an example of implied immunity.64  “It has
never been doubted, that all who are employed in [public institutions], are
protected, while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed
in any act of Congress.”65  Such immunity, the Court explained, “is incidental
to, and is implied in, the several acts by which these institutions are created,
and is secured to the individuals employed in them, by the judicial power
alone.”66
In an attempt to avoid the force of these observations, the defendants
relied “greatly on the distinction between the Bank and the public institu-
tions, such as the mint or the post office.”67  They argued that the agents of
public institutions are “officers of government,” whereas the Bank’s officers
59 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
60 Id. at 740–43.
61 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE
L.J. 263 (2007).
62 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 865.
63 Id.
64 More than a century and a half later, the Boyle Court also analogized the immunity
of government contractors to the immunity of federal officials. See Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988).
65 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 865.
66 Id. at 865–66.
67 Id. at 866.
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resembled mere “contractors.”68  The Court agreed “that the directors, or
other officers of the Bank, are [not] officers of government,”69 but nonethe-
less rejected the suggestion that states have “the right . . . to control [the
Bank’s] operations, if those operations be necessary to its character, as a
machine employed by the government.”70  In terms directly relevant to Boyle,
the Court offered the example of military contractors to illustrate its point:
Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained
from making purchases within any State, or from transporting the provisions
to the place at which the troops were stationed?  [O]r could he be fined or
taxed for doing so?  We have not yet heard these questions answered in the
affirmative.71
Although the Court acknowledged “that the property of the contractor may
be taxed, as the property of other citizens,” it refused to admit “that the act of
purchasing, or of conveying the articles purchased, can be under State
control.”72
Osborn’s discussion of government contractor immunity supports the
Court’s decision in Boyle.  The acts of contractors taken in performance of
federal contracts—like the acts of the Bank of the United States taken in
accordance with its charter—are acts authorized by federal statutes made in
pursuance of the Constitution.  The Osborn Court understood the Constitu-
tion to preempt state law that interferes with these acts on the ground that
such law is “repugnant to a law of the United States, made in pursuance of
the constitution, and, therefore, void.”73
Justice Scalia came close to making this argument in Boyle, although
neither he nor the dissenting Justices discussed (or even cited) McCulloch or
Osborn.  Instead, Justice Scalia invoked the Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Construction Co.,74 which immunized a contractor for services performed
in accordance with the terms of its government contract.75  Specifically, the
Court held that a landowner could not hold the contractor liable under state
law for the erosion of land caused by its construction of dikes for the federal
government.  Echoing Osborn, the Yearsley Court reasoned that “if what was
done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on
the part of the contractor for executing its will.”76  After quoting this lan-
guage, the Boyle Court stated that it saw no basis for distinguishing procure-
ment contracts from service contracts.77
68 Id.
69 Id. at 866–67.
70 Id. at 867.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 868.
74 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
75 Id. at 22.
76 Id. at 20–21.
77 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988).
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Even apart from McCulloch and Osborn, Justice Scalia might have drawn
additional support from the Supreme Court’s modern decision in Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.78  The Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 provided that if a broadcaster permitted a candidate
to use its airtime, then it had to give opposing candidates equal time on its
station.79  WDAY permitted two Senate candidates to give statements on air,
and then gave a third candidate equal time in reply.  In his reply, the third
candidate accused his opponents of conspiring with the plaintiff to create a
communist farmers union in the state.  The plaintiff then sued WDAY for
broadcasting this allegedly defamatory statement.80  The question before the
Court was whether federal law gave the broadcaster immunity for its part in
disseminating the statement in question.81
The Supreme Court held that broadcasters were immune from state def-
amation law based on statements they aired under the equal time rule.82
The Court acknowledged that Congress had previously considered, but failed
to enact, an express immunity provision for broadcasters in this situation.
Nonetheless, the Court found such immunity implicit in the statute in order
to avoid “the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal
liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the licen-
see.”83  A contrary reading of the statute “would either frustrate the underly-
ing purposes for which it was enacted, or alternatively impose unreasonable
burdens on the parties governed by that legislation.”84  Either way, the impo-
sition of liability under state law would have burdened or impeded the opera-
tion of federal law.
All of these precedents—from McCulloch through WDAY—support con-
stitutional preemption of state tort law in Boyle.  The Constitution gave Con-
gress power to “raise and support Armies,” to “provide and maintain a Navy,”
and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces.”85  Congress used these constitutional powers to authorize the
armed forces to procure specialized military equipment, including the heli-
copter at issue in Boyle.  Under the Court’s precedents, if the government
approves reasonably precise specifications in the course of procuring equip-
ment pursuant to its constitutional and statutory authority and the contractor
adheres to those specifications in producing the equipment, then the Consti-
tution preempts state law that would impose liability on the contractor for
faithfully performing the contract.86  Such preemption is not based on mod-
78 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
79 Id. at 526.
80 Id. at 526–27.
81 Id. at 526.
82 Id. at 535.
83 Id. at 531.
84 Id. at 535.
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14.
86 The military contractor defense approved in Boyle contains a third requirement in
order to trigger immunity: “[T]he supplier [must have] warned the United States about
the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
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ern notions of federal common law.  Rather, it is based on the constitutional
provisions empowering Congress to authorize the procurement of military
equipment, and the statutes authorizing the government to enter into the
contract in question.
Even accepting constitutional preemption in Boyle, one might ask why
the Constitution required the specific three-part test endorsed by the
Supreme Court.  The Court described “the scope of displacement” as follows:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursu-
ant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3)
the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.87
Upon analysis, these three requirements “appear merely to define and imple-
ment the constitutional preemption of state authority in this context.”88
The first requirement—that the United States have approved reasonably
precise specifications—is necessary to find a conflict between the application
of state law and the execution of a specific federal function.89  The second
requirement—that the equipment have conformed to the specifications—
ensures that the contractor was actually carrying out the task assigned by the
federal government.90  The third requirement—that the supplier have
warned the United States of dangers known to the supplier but not the
United States—serves to identify the scope of preemption in this context.
When a supplier fails to warn the United States of such dangers, the United
States may not have made the actual decision to accept the risks involved.
On the other hand, when a supplier provides the required warnings, the
United States’s decision to proceed reflects its affirmative conclusion that the
benefits outweigh the risks.  The Supremacy Clause does not permit a state to
override this conclusion.91
Understanding Boyle as an example of constitutional preemption places
the decision on a firmer constitutional foundation because it alleviates many
of the methodological problems associated with the Court’s opinion and fed-
eral common law more generally.  Under constitutional preemption, the fact
that Congress did not enact express provisions conferring immunity in
McCulloch, Osborn, WDAY, and Boyle is irrelevant because preemption results
United States.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.  The role of all three requirements in establishing
constitutional preemption is discussed below. See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying
text.
87 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
88 Clark, supra note 4, at 1372.
89 See id. at 1372–73.  Although nondiscriminatory state regulation of standard military
equipment sold “off the rack” might incidentally burden the purchase of such equipment,
the Court is unlikely to find preemption of such regulation. See Johnson v. Maryland, 254
U.S. 51, 56 (1920) (stating that it “very well may be that, when the United States has not
spoken, the subjection to local law would extend to general rules that might affect inciden-
tally the mode of carrying out the [federal] employment”).
90 See Clark, supra note 4, at 1373.
91 See id. at 1373–74.
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from the Constitution rather than an express statutory provision.  Thus,
upholding immunity in these cases did not violate constitutional principles of
separation of powers or federalism.  For example, Justice Brennan’s dissent
charged that finding immunity in Boyle violated separation of powers because
Congress had not expressly authorized such immunity.  The Marshall Court,
however, established that express statutory immunity is not necessary when
state law burdens or impedes “the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government.”92  Similarly, the immunity upheld in Boyle does not violate fed-
eralism by circumventing the Supremacy Clause and associated lawmaking
procedures because the constitutional provisions and federal statutes author-
izing the procurement in question themselves constitute the supreme law of
the land under the Clause.
Finally, using constitutional preemption to recognize immunity in Boyle
is consistent with originalism and textualism.  As Chief Justice Marshall
explained in McCulloch, the “power to tax involves the power to destroy,” and
there is a “plain repugnance” between the power to destroy in the hands of a
state and Congress’s constitutional power to authorize the activity being
taxed.93  The power to impose tort liability on congressionally authorized
activities has no less potential to destroy such activities.  Originalists recog-
nize that the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof preempt con-
trary state law.  As McCulloch and Osborn demonstrate, such constitutional
preemption is not novel.  From the Founding to the present, the Supreme
Court has understood the Constitution to prevent states from burdening,
impeding, or destroying the constitutional operations of the federal govern-
ment.  Such constitutional preemption is also consistent with textualism.
The displacement of state law in these cases rests not on questionable notions
of federal common law, but on the Supremacy Clause and an actual conflict
between state law and the constitutional provisions Congress employed to
authorize the conduct in question.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Boyle has been criticized for being both wrong
and inconsistent with his broader methodological commitments.  Certainly,
the opinion’s reliance on “federal common law” was not in keeping with Jus-
tice Scalia’s general skepticism of broad judicial discretion.  But his invoca-
tion of federal common law was also unnecessary to the Court’s decision.
The Marshall Court established early on that the Constitution does not per-
mit state law “to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the oper-
ations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution
the powers vested in the general government.”94 Boyle should have invoked
92 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
93 Id. at 431.
94 Id. at 436.
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this principle and explained that the government contractor defense is not
the result of judicial lawmaking or atextual interpretation, but “the unavoida-
ble consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared.”95
95 Id.
